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Abstract 
 
The mathematical representation of Brunswik’s lens model has been used 
extensively to study human judgment and provides a unique opportunity to conduct a 
meta-analysis of studies that covers roughly five decades. Specifically, we analyze 
statistics of the “lens model equation” (Tucker, 1964) associated with 259 different task 
environments obtained from 78 papers.  In short, we find – on average – fairly high levels 
of judgmental achievement and note that people can achieve similar levels of cognitive 
performance in both noisy and predictable environments. Although overall performance 
varies little between laboratory and field studies, both differ in terms of components of 
performance and types of environments (numbers of cues and redundancy). An analysis 
of learning studies reveals that the most effective form of feedback is information about 
the task. We also analyze empirically when bootstrapping is more likely to occur. We 
conclude by indicating shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, limitations 
in the lens model methodology, and possibilities for future research.   
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Since the 1960s, many psychologists have used the framework of Brunswik’s 
(1952) lens model to study processes where humans make predictions of specific criteria 
(see, e.g., Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Cooksey, 1996; Hastie & Kameda, 2005).  For 
example, a person might make a judgment (i.e., prediction) about another person’s 
intelligence, about the likelihood of rain, whether a job candidate will be successful, and 
so on.  In all these cases, the simple beauty of Brunswik’s model lies in recognizing that 
both the person’s judgment and the actual criterion predicted can be thought of as two 
separate functions of cues that are available in the environment.  Thus, the accuracy of 
human judgment depends on the extent to which the function that describes it matches its 
environmental counterpart. 
  But how good or accurate are people at making judgments and on what does this 
depend?  These are important questions that have generated considerable controversy in 
the psychological literature (Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1996).  Whereas it is unlikely that these questions can be answered satisfactorily by any 
particular approach, an advantage of research conducted within the Brunswikian tradition 
is the use of a common methodology for formalizing the lens model.  Thus, not only can 
researchers within this tradition communicate results within a common framework, it is 
possible to aggregate results quantitatively across many studies and make statements that 
reflect the accumulation of results.  This is the purpose of the current paper in which we 
present a meta-analysis of studies conducted using the lens model over a period of five 
decades.
  
  The paper is organized as follows. We first describe the mathematical formulation 
of the lens model. Second, we specify how we identified and included particular studies Determinants of linear judgment 
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in our analysis. Third, by summarizing the results of these studies we illuminate the issue 
of how accurate human judgment is and the factors that affect it. Since psychologists 
typically study judgment within laboratories but people use judgment outside 
laboratories, we pay particular attention to differences between laboratory and field 
studies. Fourth, since the topic of learning has been central to studies within the lens 
model tradition, we make a separate analysis of learning studies. Key topics center on 
how much learning occurs, what affects this and the impact of different types of 
feedback.  Fifth, we contribute to the discussion of the relative advantages of clinical 
judgments and their paramorphic representations (Hoffman, 1960) or bootstrapping 
models (e.g., Goldberg, 1970; Dawes, 1971; Camerer, 1981) by analyzing the conditions 
under which people are more likely to be outperformed by models of their judgments. 
Finally we conclude by summarizing the main substantive conclusions of the analysis, 
indicating shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, and suggesting avenues 
for future research.   
 
The mathematical formulation of Brunswik’s lens model 
  The use of Brunswik’s lens model received an important impetus in 1964 when a 
series of papers showed how statistical methods could be used to capture judgmental 
processes (Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; 
Tucker, 1964. See also Castellan, 1973).  In this, human judgment, denoted Ys, is 
modeled as a linear function of a set of k cues, Xj, j = 1,…k.  Thus,  
     s
k
j
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where the βs,j’s represent the weights that the person (or judge) gives to the different cues 
and εs is the error term of the regression of Ys on the Xj’s.  
Similarly, the environmental criterion, Ye, can be modeled as a function of the 




j j e e X Y ε β + =∑
=1
,         ( 2 )  
where the βe,j’s represent the weights that the environment gives to the different cues and 
εe is the error term of the regression of Ye on the Xj’s – see Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
The logic of the lens model is that the person’s decisions will match the 
environmental criterion to the extent that the weights the judge gives to the cues match 
those used by the model of the environment, i.e., the matches between βs,j and βe,j for all j 
= 1,…k. Moreover, the correlation between criterion and judgment,  
s eY Y ρ – the so-called 
“achievement” index or ra – can be expressed by the “lens model equation”     
    
() ( )
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where G = 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ ρ  (the “matching” index) is the correlation between the predictions of both 
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, β ; Re and Rs are, respectively, the multiple 
correlations of the models of the environment and the judge, and capture, on the one 
hand, environmental predictability (Re), and on the other hand, the consistency with 
which the judge executes the decision rule (Rs); and C =
s eε ε ρ  is the correlation between Determinants of linear judgment 
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the error terms of the two models. If these are independent, i.e., 0 =
s eε ε ρ , then judgmental 
accuracy or achievement (ra) is simply a multiplicative function of three terms: matching 
(G), environmental predictability (Re), and response consistency (Rs), and neatly captures 
the effects of both cognitive and task variables on observed performance.  In practice, C 
may actually differ from 0 if, say, a variable has been omitted from the analysis and/or 
cues are used in a nonlinear manner.  
  In addition to the basic lens model statistics indicated above, we are interested in 
the products of two of these statistics. First, it is illuminating to analyze the human 
component of achievement independently of the predictability of the environment. For 
situations where C  =  0, this can be represented by the product of matching, G, and 
response consistency, Rs. This product, GRs, named “performance” by Lindell (1976) and 
“linear cognitive ability” by Hogarth and Karelaia (2006), neatly captures the extent to 
which judges both match task requirements and are consistent in the execution of their 
strategies. 
Second, the product of matching, G, and environmental predictability, Re, is an 
estimate of the validity of the bootstrapping model of the judge (Goldberg, 1970; Dawes, 
1971; Camerer, 1981). This product, GRe, is interesting in that it captures the validity of 
the judge’s strategy assuming that the strategy is applied in a perfectly consistent manner 
(i.e., when Rs = 1). In other words, it captures what would happen if a judge was replaced 
by his or her model.   
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Database for the meta-analysis 
 By searching several databases, key articles, and consulting leading contributors 
to the literature, we identified some 200 published and unpublished works that suggested 
that they might contain lens model data, specifically the components of Equation 3. 
1  We 
excluded from consideration works that failed to model the environmental side of the lens 
(i.e., for which criterion data were missing), studies that used aggregate as opposed to 
individual judgments (see, e.g., Gifford, 1994) as well as research within the conflict 
resolution paradigm in which the criterion for one person is the judgments of others (see, 
e.g., Hammond, Wilkins, & Todd, 1966).  From these 200 works we identified 78 that 
contained full (or almost full) lens model statistics.  These works were published between 
1954 and 2006, one half being published before 1984, and the other half afterwards.
2 
Most of these studies examined judgments in more than one environment or experimental 
setting. Thus, we ended up with a total of 259 different environments in which judgments 
were made. The mean number of participants in the 259 environments was 19 (inter-
quartile range, 10 to 24), each making, on average, 88 judgments (inter-quartile range,  25 
to 91).  The total number of individual judgments on which our results are based is thus 
large – almost 320,000.
3 
We characterized each of the 259 data points by the averages of the lens model 
statistics of the participants in each of these environments.  These averages were either 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that, on completing our analysis, we became aware of another recent meta-analysis 
of lens model studies conducted by Kaufmann and Athanasou (2007). The scope of their work, however, is 
more limited than ours and their criteria for including studies in the analysis are different. Their work 
should thus be considered complementary to what is presented here.  
 
2 We note, incidentally, that when splitting the 1954 - 2006 period into five-year periods, the 1972-1976 
period contains the largest number of published papers, 21. Interest in the topic then declined, as judged by 
the number of papers we identified, but increased again at the end of the 1990s.  
 
3 In fact, the total is somewhat larger because this figure excludes all but the last block of learning trials. Determinants of linear judgment 
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taken directly from the papers, inferred (e.g., from graphs), or calculated by making use 
of the properties of the lens model equation (Equation 3).  In many experimental papers, 
no value was given for C (the correlation between the residuals of the models of the judge 
and environment), and this was assumed to be 0 (a reasonable assumption given the way 
in which experimental data were generated).  We emphasize that our unit of analysis is 
the average of statistics of individuals within each environment as opposed to the actual 
individual statistics. Unfortunately, only a few papers provided individual level data and 
so we are unable to comment on variation within the different environments.   
In addition to the lens model statistics for all 259 observations, we encoded 
variables that characterized both the specific tasks and participants (these are described 
below and in Table 2). When studies explicitly considered learning over several blocks of 
trials, we limited our attention to statistics for the first and last blocks.  The latter were 
used to capture general performance and aggregated with the non-learning data.  The 
former were used as a baseline to capture the effects of learning relative to levels 
exhibited in the last blocks of trials (see below).  
  
How accurate is human judgment overall?  
The upper part of Table 1 reports mean values of the lens model statistics for the 
data we examined.  Note that, with the exception of environmental predictability, Re, our 
data points are themselves means, and that there is considerable variability in that almost 
all indices vary between their theoretically possible minima and maxima. Across all 259 
observations, mean achievement, ra, is 0.55, mean matching, G, is 0.81 (the median of G 
is notably higher, 0.91), and mean response consistency, Rs, reaches 0.80. On the Determinants of linear judgment 
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environmental side, predictability, Re, is 0.79 on average, and mean non-linear 
component, C, equals 0.05.  
It is interesting to note that mean Re and mean Rs are close in value as this 
suggests a kind of overall (or mean) probability matching phenomenon. As just noted, 
mean Re is a “true mean” whereas mean Rs is a “mean of means.” Thus, whereas the 
reported standard deviation of Rs is smaller than that of Re, this hides the fact that in any 
given study values of  Rs at the individual level can vary quite a lot for fixed levels of Re. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-----------------------------------------------  
As for the two composite statistics, mean linear cognitive ability, GRs, is 0.66, 
with its median slightly higher at 0.73.  The mean validity of bootstrapping models, GRe, 
is 0.64 and surpasses mean achievement of clinical judgment, 0.55. 
To explore relations between the various indices, the lower part of Table 1 
presents pair-wise correlations. Several significant correlations (p < 0.01) come as no 
surprise.
4 In particular, consistent with Equation 3, there are high positive correlations 
between achievement, ra, and (a) matching, G, 0.77; (b) response consistency, Rs, 0.52; 
and (c) environmental predictability, Re, 0.40. Less obvious a priori is the significant 
correlation between the two statistics that characterize performance independent of 
environmental predictability, namely matching, G,  and response consistency, Rs. This 
correlation is positive, 0.42, and suggests that decision makers who match the 
environment better are also more consistent in executing their judgment.  
                                                 
4 For statistical purposes, we conduct our analysis by treating each of our 259 observations as though these 
are random drawings from an underlying population of environments.  This is patently a false assumption. 
We therefore use statistical tests in the spirit of heuristic guides as opposed to “hypothesis tests.” Determinants of linear judgment 
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Another striking result is that neither consistency, Rs, nor matching, G, correlates 
with environmental predictability, Re (correlations of 0.08 and -0.01, respectively). That 
is, decision makers can reach similar levels of performance/linear cognitive ability in 
both noisy and predictable environments.  
Finally, the fact that ra and C, the non-linear component, are moderately 
correlated (0.28) suggests significant non-linear usage of cues and/or omitted variables 
(i.e., judges were using information of which investigators were unaware).  
 
What factors affect the accuracy of human judgment?  
For all 259 environments, we encoded (when available) seven variables that could 
potentially affect the level of human judgment. Six involve characteristics of 
environments or tasks and one of decision makers.  These variables are also listed on the 
left hand side of Table 2. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Environments vary, first, in the number of cues. This can be taken as a surrogate 
measure of task complexity (i.e., given limited information processing capacity). We 
code the data into three groups: two, three, or more than three cues. 
Second, we distinguish between environments where cues are “given” as opposed 
to “achieved.”  For the former, decision makers are provided with the explicit values of 
the cues by the experimenter. For the latter, the values of the cues need to be inferred – 
and often even identified – by decision makers.    Determinants of linear judgment 
  11 
Third, we classify environments by the level of inter-cue redundancy as either 
“none” (no redundancy), “some” (if average cue inter-correlation is less than 0.4, or 
redundancy is described as being: “low,”  “moderate,”  “some”), or “high” (otherwise).  
Fourth, we classify the distributions of the environmental weights βe,j’s  given to 
cues in three groups. In particular, we define weighting functions as non-compensatory if, 
when cue weights are ordered in magnitude, the weight of each cue exceeds the sum of 
those smaller than it (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999; 2002). All other functions are 
classified as compensatory except for the special case of equal-weighting.  
Fifth, we consider differences between laboratory experiments and field studies.   
Sixth, we distinguish between environments in which participants were explicitly 
given the possibility to learn over several blocks of trials and environments without this 
possibility. We label the latter “stable” environments. For “learning” environments, we 
also record the number of learning trials and type of feedback given to participants. We 
classify feedback into five categories: none, outcome feedback, cognitive feedback, task 
information feedback, and other types of feedback.  Outcome feedback is simply 
knowledge of the outcome of a judgment. Cognitive (or process) feedback refers to data 
involving the judge's decision policies (e.g., βs,j’s,  the weights given to the different 
cues). Task information feedback is information about true relations in the environment 
(e.g., βe,j’s) rather than relations perceived by the judge (i.e., cognitive feedback). 
Seventh, it is reasonable to assume that initial level of expertise may be important 
for achievement. We therefore classify participants in three groups: “novices,”  “experts” 
(two extreme categories), and “some training” (an intermediate category).  Determinants of linear judgment 
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In what follows, we analyze the role that each of these variables plays in 
determining levels of human achievement and performance. The data described below are 
presented in Table 2. In particular, Table 2 classifies the data according to the   variables 
enumerated above and specifies the numbers of environments falling into each category, 
average numbers of judges in the environments, average numbers of judgments made by 
each judge, and means of lens model indices. In what follows, we use the 0.05 
significance level in statistical tests, unless indicated otherwise.  
Number of cues. Given well-established limitations on human information 
processing, it is often argued that the linear model does not provide a good description of 
judgment when the number of cues is large (cf., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  At 
the same time, when decision makers have many cues available, redundancies might 
increase achievement. What do the data say about these issues?    
There are two significant effects of the number of cues in the task. First, in these 
data, the non-linear component, C, is smaller in the environments with three cues (0.00 
vs. 0.07 and 0.08 for the two-cue and more-than-three-cues environments, respectively). 
Second, mean matching, G, is much smaller in environments with more cues. That is, 
with more than three cues, an average judge has a matching index of 0.71, while for the 
environments with fewer cues the analogous index is 0.88. Given that response 
consistency, Rs, does not correlate with the number of cues, the final impact of this task 
variable on the decision maker’s performance, GRs, is similar to the effect described 
above on  G.  In particular, in environments with more than three cues, participants had, 
on average, a lower level of GRs, 0.58 (vs. an average of 0.72 for all other environments). Determinants of linear judgment 
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As for human achievement, ra, it also reaches its lowest level in the environments 
with more than three cues, 0.51, which is significantly different from the 0.63 
corresponding to the environments with two cues. Importantly, the two-cue and more-
than-three-cue environments have similar levels of all lens model indices except for 
matching, G, and, therefore, the difference in human achievement, ra, can be attributed to 
the difference in the levels of G. This picture changes, however, if the environments with 
three cues are used as a reference point in interpreting the figures in the environments 
with more than three cues. In this comparison, the effect of G  (0.88 vs. 0.71) on 
achievement, ra, is masked by the differences observed in the levels of the non-linear 
component, C (0.00 vs. 0.08). As a result, the difference between achievement levels in 
the environments with three cues (0.55) and more than three cues (0.51) is not significant.  
Overall, we find that judges match the environment worse when there are more 
than three cues and that human achievement is negatively affected by a large number of 
cues (see also Einhorn, 1971). Below, we shall address further the issue of the relation 
between the number of cues and inter-cue redundancy.    
Given/achieved cues. In addition to weighting and combining information, an 
important dimension of many judgmental tasks involves identifying and assessing levels 
of relevant information (Einhorn, 1972).  In these data, we find that whether cues were 
directly given to participants or had to be achieved affects neither matching, G (0.82 vs. 
0.79, respectively; the difference is not significant) nor response consistency, Rs (0.81 vs. 
0.79, respectively; the difference is not significant). As a consequence, the difference 
between the levels of human achievement, ra, in the studies where cues are achieved by 
judges (0.60) and in the studies where the cues are provided directly by experimenters Determinants of linear judgment 
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(0.55) is not statistically significant, even though the non-linear component, C, is much 
larger in the environments with achieved as opposed to given cues (0.13 vs. 0.03, 
respectively). The difference in C suggests that when cues had to be “achieved,” judges 
were relying on information that investigators did not include in the corresponding 
models of environments.  
For further insight, we analyzed the effect of this variable separately in 
environments with different numbers of cues (see previous section). While we do not 
have a sufficient number of environments with achieved cues within the groups of two- 
and three-cue environments, we observed a significant effect of this task variable within 
the environments with more than three cues. In particular, achievement, ra, is greater 
when cues are achieved (0.62, n = 27) than when these are given (0.46, n = 67). 
Interestingly, within the environments with more than three cues, we find additionally 
significant effects of this variable on both matching, G, and consistency, Rs. In particular, 
judges match the environment better when cues are achieved (0.80, n = 27 vs. 0.67 in 67 
environments with given cues), but show greater judgmental consistency when cues are 
given (0.83, n = 67 vs. 0.75 in 27 environments with achieved cues).   
Overall, we find no evidence in the data that either matching or response 
consistency is affected by the way judges obtain the cue values.  However, in a subset of 
data – environments with more than three cues – we find that judges match 
environmental weights better but are less consistent in applying their models when they 
need to infer cue values as opposed to when these are directly provided by experimenters.     
Inter-cue redundancy. Inter-cue redundancy is a functional element of decision 
environments in that it facilitates what Brunswik (1943; 1952) referred to as “vicarious Determinants of linear judgment 
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functioning” or the interchangeability of cues.  It thereby contributes to improving the 
reliability of overall judgments and can help to limit information search without 
significant reductions in judgmental accuracy (Connolly & Miklausich, 1978; Einhorn, 
Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979).  
 In these data, however, we do not observe any beneficial effect of inter-cue 
redundancy on human achievement, ra. Indeed, we find an inverse relation: mean 
achievement, ra, is significantly higher when there is no redundancy (0.61) than when 
there is “some” (0.53) or it is “high” (0.54). A similar tendency is observed with respect 
to the average level of matching, G (0.89 vs. 0.78 and 0.76, respectively). Interestingly, 
the non-linear component, C, is higher in environments with high redundancy (0.10 vs. 
0.03 in all other environments).  
Although surprising at first, the effect of redundancy may be due (at least partially) 
to a positive correlation of this task variable with the number of cues, 0.33 (n = 208,              
p < 0.001). In particular, only 15% of environments with more than three cues contain no 
inter-cue redundancy which is well below the 56% of environments with two cues, and 
80% of environments with three cues. (In addition, among the environments with three 
cues, none is classified as containing high redundancy.)  
To distinguish the effects of inter-cue redundancy and the number of cues on 
human judgment, we regressed (separately) achievement, ra, matching, G, and response 
consistency, Rs, on the number of cues and the level of cue redundancy. To control for the 
linear predictability of environments, we included two more predictors: the non-linear 
component, C, and environmental predictability, Re. We used a robust weighted least 
squares (WLS) regression procedure. The results of these regressions showed no Determinants of linear judgment 
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significant effect of cue redundancy on ether achievement, ra, or response consistency, Rs. 
However, when explaining the variance of matching G, the regression coefficient for 
redundancy is negative and significant (robust t = -2.65, p = 0.009).
5  That is, in these 
data, subjects matched environmental weights better when cue redundancy was smaller, 
controlling for the number of cues and linear environmental predictability.  
We conclude therefore that the data do not show any positive effect of cue 
redundancy on human judgment and even suggests that matching, G, suffers from higher 
redundancy. 
Weighting function form.  An important topic of lens model research has focused 
on how well experimental participants handle different types of functional relations 
between cues and the criterion (see, e.g., Brehmer, 1980). The data reveal a significant 
effect of how cues are weighted by the environment.  In particular, of the three types of 
functions we consider, the lowest level of mean human achievement, ra, (0.51) 
corresponds to environments where this is non-compensatory. Mean achievement is 
highest (0.66) in equal-weighting environments whereas the mean for compensatory 
environments lies between these extremes (0.57).  
   We note that two variables seem to explain this effect. First, in non-compensatory 
environments, participants did the worst job in matching the environmental weights 
(mean G is 0.80 vs. 0.84 in compensatory environments and 0.91 in environments with 
equal weights). Second, mean response consistency, Rs, is also   lowest in the non-
compensatory environments: 0.74 vs. 0.82 in all other environments.  
                                                 
5 A robust OLS procedure with While-adjusted standard errors gives similar results, except that the value of 
t-statistics of the coefficient for redundancy decreases to -1.81 (p=0.072).  Determinants of linear judgment 
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The joint effect of these two variables magnifies the difference in 
performance/linear cognitive ability, GRs, between the different types of environments. 
According to the data, the most “difficult” environments involve non-compensatory 
weighting schemes (mean GRs = 0.62), followed by compensatory environments (mean 
GRs = 0.70). The equal-weighting environments are best suited to applying a linear model 
(mean GRs = 0.75).  
Laboratory and field studies.  An important dimension of the Brunswikian 
research philosophy centers on the concept of representative design (Brunswik, 1956). 
While field studies are naturally representative, laboratory studies may or may not reflect 
formal properties of naturalistic environments. Thus, it is of interest to compare 
laboratory and field studies on two dimensions.  First, do the conditions of laboratory 
studies mirror those of field studies? Second, do participants have differential 
achievement and performance in the two kinds of environments?  
In field studies (n = 48), mean matching, G, was lower than in laboratory studies 
(n = 208), 0.74 vs. 0.83 (the difference is significant).  There are no other differences 
between field and laboratory studies in the data. The overall effect of this task variable on 
performance/linear cognitive ability, GRs, and achievement, ra, is negligible.  
  For further insight, we analyze the effect of this task variable controlling for the 
number of cues in the environments. In fact, all field studies contained more than three 
cues, while only 50 of the 208 laboratory studies (24%) did. We therefore limit further 
analysis to the environments with more than three cues. In doing so, we find that the 
difference in consistency, Rs, becomes significant (“field” being more consistent, on Determinants of linear judgment 
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average, than “laboratory”, 0.84 vs. 0.78), but the difference in matching, G, becomes 
insignificant. The overall effect on achievement, ra, remains negligible.  
  Since the number of cues affects inter-cue redundancy, we split the data along two 
dimensions: laboratory/field and the level of redundancy (Table 3). We find that the field 
studies better reflect naturalistic decision environments in that they contain, on average, 
more redundancy than laboratory studies. In particular, none of the field studies lacked 
redundancy, about half contained some, and the other half a lot. The majority of 
laboratory studies (62%) had no redundancy. In the environments with high redundancy, 
the difference in mean human achievement, ra, between laboratory and field studies is 
striking: 0.36 vs. 0.61 (the difference is significant, though the validity of this finding is 
weakened by the low number of observations, 7, in one group).  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-----------------------------------------------  
   Does environmental predictability, Re, have the same importance for human 
achievement in laboratory and field studies? We analyze the correlation between Re and 
other components of human achievement in laboratory and field studies separately and 
find that, in laboratory studies, environmental predictability, Re, correlates with neither 
matching,  G, nor response consistency, Rs.  In the more naturalistic field studies, 
however, we find that when environments are more predictable, participants are more 
consistent (corr(Re; Rs) = 0.52, n = 45, p < 0.001). Matching, G, however, is unaffected 
by environmental predictability, Re (within field studies, corr(Re; G) = 0.22, n = 45, ns.). 
As a result, in field studies, greater environmental predictability implies greater linear Determinants of linear judgment 
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cognitive ability or performance, that is, the correlation between Re and GRs  is  0.35             
(n = 45, p = 0.020).   
Parenthetically, we note that some thirty years ago, Brehmer (1976) showed – in a 
small sample – that Re   and Rs were positively correlated in field studies and claimed that 
this relation was also observed in laboratory studies.  Our larger sample of evidence does 
not support the latter claim. 
Expertise. It is possible to point to individual studies of judgmental achievement 
involving acknowledged experts that indicate both abysmal (Einhorn, 1972) and 
incredibly accurate performance (Stewart, Roebber, & Bosart, 1997). However, what are 
the general trends?  
In these data, the initial level of expertise (as opposed to expertise acquired through 
learning in the experimental studies) does not affect the level of achievement, ra (all 
relevant differences in Table 2 are not significant). However, for matching, G, and 
consistency, Rs, we find some unexpected trends. In particular, participants classified as 
“experts” have the lowest level of matching, G (0.68, significantly different from 0.83, 
the mean G among “novices”), and are not more consistent than their less experienced 
colleagues (the mean Rs’s for experts and novices, 0.83 and 0.79, are not significantly 
different).  
Note, however, that environments that involved experts had, on average, a greater 
non-linear component, C (0.17 vs. 0.03 in environments that involved novices), and a 
lower level of linear environmental predictability, Re (0.74 vs. 0.81 in environments that 
involved novices). To separate the effects of the task characteristics from the effect of 
expertise, we regressed (separately) achievement, ra, matching, G, and response Determinants of linear judgment 
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consistency, Rs, on the non-linear component, C, environmental predictability, Re, and the 
variable characterizing the level of expertise. We used a robust WLS regression 
procedure. The results of these regressions showed no significant effect of expertise on 
ether achievement, ra, or matching, G. However, when explaining the variance of 
response consistency, Rs, the regression coefficient for expertise is positive and 
significant (robust t = 2.59, p = 0.010). That is, controlling for linear environmental 
predictability and the non-linear component of environments, we find that the experts 
were more consistent than novices in applying their decision policies                           
(cf., quasi-rationality hypothesis in Brehmer, 1994).  
We conclude that the initial level of expertise does not affect how well individuals 
match environmental structures but is important for consistency in applying individual 
policies. The effect of the initial level of expertise on judgmental consistency is, however, 
insufficient in these data to impact the overall level of human achievement. We next 
examine the effect of expertise acquired through learning during the experimental trials.  
 
 How effective is learning? The role of feedback   
We first compare the results of environments that involved learning trials and those 
in which participants did not have the possibility to learn the task (i.e., “stable” 
environments).  We next focus only on environments involving learning to uncover 
additional factors (such as different types of feedback) that contribute to acquiring 
expertise.  
In these data, learning as opposed to stable environments are more predictable 
(mean  Re of 0.82 vs. 0.72, Table 2) and involve, on average, less of the non-linear Determinants of linear judgment 
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component,  C (0.03 vs. 0.09). As for human performance, both mean matching, G, and 
mean response consistency, Rs,, are larger in learning environments (0.85 vs. 0.70, and 
0.82 vs. 0.77, respectively), in line with the values of the environmental parameters Re 
and C. As a result, in learning as compared to stable environments, average cognitive 
linear ability, GRs, is also larger (0.71 vs. 0.54), as well as average achievement, ra (0.60 
vs. 0.44).  
To understand whether it is environmental predictability, Re, or the possibility to 
learn the task that accounts for better matching and consistency in learning environments, 
we regressed (separately) matching, G, consistency, Rs, cognitive linear ability, GRs, and 
achievement, ra, on environmental predictability, Re, non-linear component, C, and the 
two-level dummy variable, learning/stable. We used a robust WLS regression procedure. 
All four regressions show a significant positive effect of the possibility to acquire 
expertise. That is, when controlling for C  and  Re, learning improves matching, G            
(t(238) = 3.55, p < 0.001), consistency, Rs (t(239) = 2.11, p = 0.036), cognitive linear 
ability, GRs (t(233) = 5.12, p < 0.001), and achievement, ra (t(241) = 5.45, p < 0.001). 
Interestingly, the three predictor variables (Re, C, and the dummy learning/stable) jointly 
explain about 48% (adjusted R
2) of the variance of human achievement.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-----------------------------------------------  
Since the presence of redundancy is important for human performance (Brunswik, 
1952), we next examine the effect of learning in environments with different levels of 
redundancy (Table 4). In the group of environments with high inter-cue redundancy, 
learning has a large effect on linear cognitive ability, GRs. In particular, mean GRs is only Determinants of linear judgment 
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0.46 in stable environments while it reaches 0.83 in learning environments (the difference 
is significant). The effect of learning is less pronounced, but still notable, when cue 
redundancy is lower. Here mean GRs is 0.58 in stable environments and 0.69 in learning 
environments (the difference is also significant). When all cues are independent, 
however, there is no effect of learning. This finding emphasizes the importance of 
redundancy not only for human performance but also for better learning and the 
acquisition of expertise.    
In these data, field studies contained, on average, more redundancy than laboratory 
studies. Therefore, we next analyze whether the effect of learning is more pronounced in 
field than laboratory studies. First, within stable environments there is no difference in 
mean  GRs  between laboratory and field studies (0.55 vs. 0.52, the difference is not 
significant). Within learning environments, however, mean GRs is larger for field than 
laboratory studies (0.81 vs. 0.70, t = - 2.18, p < 0.05). That is, positive effects of learning 
are present in both laboratory and field studies, but more so in field studies. This finding 
suggests that field studies provide better conditions for learning than laboratory studies, 
possibly due to larger levels of inter-cue redundancy in the field environments. 
  We next limit our analysis to environments that involved learning to understand 
better what factors increase the magnitude of learning effects. We analyze the changes in 
linear cognitive ability, GRs, and achievement, ra, that occurred due to learning (i.e., 
changes between the first and last blocks of trials).  From 186 learning environments, 163 
contain both pre-learning (i.e., the first block) and post-learning (i.e., the last block) lens 
model statistics. On average, there were 103 learning trials in the environments. The 
mean improvement of linear cognitive ability, GRs, through these trials was 0.20 (39% Determinants of linear judgment 
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more than the pre-learning level), and the mean improvement of achievement, ra, was 
0.18 (44% more than the pre-learning level) – see Table 5.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
-----------------------------------------------  
To identify task and individual characteristics that affect the magnitude of learning 
we regressed the changes in linear cognitive ability, GRs, and achievement, ra, 
(separately) on the following variables: number of cues, type of cues (achieved or given), 
cue redundancy, weighting function form, type of study (laboratory or field), expertise,  
number of learning trials, and four dummies representing the presence of outcome 
feedback, cognitive feedback, task information, and other types of feedback. In addition, 
we controlled for the pre-learning levels of human performance since these can limit the 
space for learning. That is, when explaining the changes in GRs, an additional 
explanatory variable was the initial level of GRs; in the regression of the changes in ra, 
this was the initial level of ra.  
We are especially interested in the effect of different kinds of feedback on learning. 
Previous literature has shown that outcome feedback is helpful in simple (e.g., two cue) 
tasks (Doherty, Tweney, O'Connor, & Walker, 1988), but not in complex, uncertain tasks 
(Brehmer, 1980; Hoffman, Earle & Slovic, 1981). Outcome feedback may even deter 
learning under uncertainty (Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 1973). Regarding other types 
of feedback, people learn more from task information feedback than from cognitive 
feedback (Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989). Moreover, when combined with 
cognitive or outcome feedback, task information feedback is more effective (Reilly & 
Doherty, 1992; Balzer, Sulsky, Hammer, & Sumner, 1992). However, sometimes Determinants of linear judgment 
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providing task information only may be sufficient (Reilly & Doherty, 1992; Remus, 
O’Connor, & Griggs, 1996). 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 6. We used both an OLS 
procedure with White-adjusted standard errors (with and without intercept, Models 1A 
and 1B) and a robust WLS procedure (Model 2). All regressions show that GRs increases 
due to learning more when (1) the initial level of GRs is lower, and (2) task information is 
available to judges. The effects of initial expertise (negative), number of cues (positive), 
and type of cues (more learning when cues are achieved) are less robust but significant.  
Indeed, when task information was given, GRs increased by, on average, 0.35, while 
mean improvement was 0.28 when no feedback was available (Table 5). When cues were 
achieved, mean GRs improvement was 0.47, much larger than the analogous learning 
effect in the environments with given cues (0.17).  The magnitude of the difference 
between conditions should, however, be interpreted with caution given the differences in 
the initial values (see the last two columns of Table 5). When task information was given, 
GRs increased by, on average, 0.35, while mean improvement was 0.28 when no 
feedback was available.  
As for the improvement in achievement, ra, all three regressions indicate that it is 
larger when the initial level of ra is lower. Positive effects of the number of learning 
trials, number of cues, achieved (vs. given) cues, and greater cue redundancy are also 
significant, although not robust, similar to a negative effect of initial expertise.   
We do not find any evidence that the availability of outcome or cognitive feedback 
improves human performance. Given the regression results described above, the 
differences in the levels of performance improvement that occurred in the presence of Determinants of linear judgment 
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outcome or cognitive feedback and without any feedback (Table 5) can be totally 
attributed to the differences in pre-learning levels of performance and other task 
characteristics.  
Interestingly, within learning environments, we found a high positive correlation 
between pre-learning and post-learning levels of consistency (Rs)  of  0.74  (n  =  130,                  
p < 0.001). That is, participants with better initial performance kept their advantage after 
the learning trials.  
To summarize, we find that, first, when the possibility to acquire expertise is 
available, individuals reach better levels of matching, G, response consistency, Rs ,  linear 
cognitive ability, GRs, and achievement, ra.  Second, the effect of learning is questionable 
in the environments with low cue redundancy. Third, positive effects of learning are 
especially notable in naturalistic environments, such as field studies, as opposed to 
laboratory experiments. Fourth, the availability of task information magnifies the effect 
of learning. Neither outcome nor cognitive feedback helps to learn. Fifth, individuals 
learn more when they have to infer cue values from the context rather than when cue 
values are explicitly provided. And finally, in these data, there is some evidence that 
more learning trials imply greater improvements in performance.  
  
What factors affect the accuracy of bootstrapping models?  
The validity of bootstrapping models can only really be tested on out-of-sample 
cross-validation. However, it can be instructive to analyze the potential sizes of effects 
due to different variables based on past samples of data. We therefore next analyze the Determinants of linear judgment 
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data to isolate the conditions under which the application of bootstrapping would seem   
differentially advantageous.  
We define the advantage of bootstrapping models as the difference between linear 
achievement with perfect consistency (i.e., GRe) and human achievement (i.e., ra). We 
report this measure in the last column of Table 2. As might be expected, the effect of 
eliminating judgmental inconsistency more than outweighs any advantages of the non-
linear component, C, and bootstrapping is always more effective (cf., Goldberg, 1970; 
Camerer, 1981).   (All entries in the last column of Table 2 are positive.) What is more 
interesting, however, is to identify the task and judge characteristics that potentially favor 
bootstrapping models.  
To do this, we regress the bootstrapping advantage,( ) a e r GR − , on various task and 
judge characteristics, using a robust WLS procedure to account for outliers. We report 
significant regression coefficients in Table 7. Two regression models were examined: the 
first contained Re and Rs among the predictor variables; the second included instead the 
difference between these terms, i.e.,( ) s e R R − . We find that the advantage of 
bootstrapping is larger when: (1) cues are given (vs. achieved); (2) redundancy is lower 
(vs. higher); (3) judges initially have less expertise; and (4) judges do not have the 
possibility of acquiring additional expertise through learning. In addition, there is some 
evidence that the advantage of bootstrapping over clinical judgment is larger in 
laboratory as opposed to field studies.  
A possible explanation of the effect for the type of cues is that inferring (i.e.,   
achieving) cue values may itself be the key to high performance levels regardless of the 
accuracy of the subsequent processes of matching and executing (consistently or not) a Determinants of linear judgment 
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particular decision strategy. The role that cue redundancy “vicariously” (Brunswik, 1952) 
plays in human judgment (e.g., interchangeability of the cues) could explain why 
bootstrapping models lose their advantage when redundancy increases. In what concerns 
experience, bootstrapping may be less advantageous than clinical judgment when judges 
possess more expertise (either initial or acquired) precisely because expertise may allow 
judges to integrate in their judgments non-linear elements that cannot be captured 
otherwise by a model of the judge. Finally, the advantage of bootstrapping over clinical 
judgment in laboratory as opposed to field studies is probably a consequence of the fact 
that, in the former, the non-linear component, C, was often constrained to 0.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-----------------------------------------------  
Regarding the parameters of the lens model, the advantage of bootstrapping 
models is larger when environments are more predictable (positive coefficient of Re), 
judges are less consistent (negative coefficient of Rs), and when environments are more 
predictable than judges (negative coefficient of( ) s e R R − ). These findings correspond to 
what was found in earlier studies of the effectiveness of bootstrapping (e.g., Camerer, 
1981). Finally, we find that the advantage of bootstrapping models is larger when the 
non-linear component, C, is smaller (negative coefficient of C). This, however, comes as 
no surprise since bootstrapping models are linear models of judges.  
 
Discussion           
Summary.  We consider that the environments we examined have essentially 
demonstrated three important findings but that these are subject to a number of Determinants of linear judgment 
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limitations (of generalization).  In short, the findings are these: (1) People are capable of 
achieving high levels of judgmental performance. Moreover, we identified several task 
and judge characteristics that determine how good this performance can be. (2) People 
learn best from feedback that instructs them about the characteristics of the tasks they 
face. (3) People are inconsistent in the application of their judgmental rules such that 
models of their judgments are typically more accurate than they are themselves (i.e., 
getting rid of inconsistency is generally better than getting rid of idiosyncratic knowledge 
that is not captured by linear models). Once again, several task and judge parameters 
delimit the conditions under which bootstrapping is most effective.  
We next summarize the factors that, according to our results, affect the accuracy of 
human judgment. First, when the number of cues is large, judges match environmental 
models worse and, consequently, the levels of judgmental performance are lower (cf., 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
Second, inter-cue redundancy adds more difficulty to matching environmental 
models. (But, see below our arguments of why the lens model methodology may not be 
the best way to capture the effects of redundancy on final judgments). We find, however, 
that the presence of redundancy is crucial for successful learning. The effect of learning is 
questionable in the environments with low cue redundancy.  
Third, controlling for task complexity (as measured by the number of cues), the 
levels of human achievement are higher when judges infer cue values as opposed to using 
the values directly provided by experimenters. This occurs because judges match 
environmental weights better while inferring cue values, even though in these conditions 
individuals are less consistent in applying their models.  Determinants of linear judgment 
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Fourth, human achievement is higher in environments that weigh different cues in a 
more equal manner. In environments with differentially weighted cues, both the matching 
and consistency that judges demonstrate are smaller.   
Fifth, in field studies, judges are more consistent in applying their decision 
strategies when environments are more predictable. This is not true for laboratory 
experiments (cf., Brehmer, 1976).  
And finally, controlling for linear predictability and non-linear components of 
environments, we find that experts are more consistent (and therefore more predictable) 
in applying their decision strategies than novices. We do not find, however, any 
difference in how well experts and novices match environmental models.  
Among other things, these results suggest that individuals may have preconceived, 
simplified expectations of decision environments and try to apply decision strategies 
coherent with these expectations (see also, Brehmer, 1980; 1994). In our data, 
redundancy-free and equal-weighting environments are most favorable to the strategies 
that judges use and, in fact, equal-weighting strategies generally provide a good default 
(Dawes & Corrigan, 1974). The presence of redundancy and differential cue weights 
creates a misbalance between individual expectations and environmental structure, and 
therefore hurts individual performance.  In the presence of such imbalance, a good 
amount of learning is needed to improve human performance. This implies that correct 
application of decision strategies that rely heavily on a single cue or few cues (e.g., 
representativeness heuristic, Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; availability heuristic, Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973; “take-the-best” heuristic, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) requires a Determinants of linear judgment 
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certain level of expertise.
6 Performance levels that can be achieved by novices when 
applying such strategies are rather limited, especially in the environments when cue 
redundancy, and therefore cue interchangeability, is low.  
Regarding the effects of learning, we find that, in addition to redundancy, it is 
information feedback that improves learning, while neither outcome nor cognitive 
feedback helps to learn. The effectiveness of task feedback has indeed been emphasized 
in the literature (e.g., Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989), while the effectiveness of 
outcome feedback has been questioned (e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Hammond, Summers, & 
Deane, 1973; Hoffman, Earle & Slovic, 1981). In terms of “surprising” results, we were 
puzzled to find that there were larger effects for learning in field as opposed to laboratory 
environments. Our surprise was because we thought it would be easier for judges to 
appreciate relations in a laboratory than in the field. However, the reason may be that 
greater redundancy in the latter facilitated performance.  
  We identified several relevant task and judge characteristics concerning the 
conditions under which the application of bootstrapping models is differentially 
advantageous. In particular, bootstrapping outperforms  clinical  judgment  more  when:         
(1) environments are more predictable, and in particular, when these are more predictable 
than judges (cf., Camerer, 1981); (2) the non-linear component of environments is 
smaller; (3) cue values are given rather than inferred by judges; (4) cue redundancy is 
low; (5) judges are less experienced; and (6) there are no opportunities for learning.            
In terms of more detailed findings, it is useful to consider what the data tell us 
about the effects of the different lens model statistics represented in Equation 3. Although 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, various studies indeed have reported that experts use surprisingly little information (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1970). 
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(as shown in Table 1), there was variation in ranges across all the statistics, it is of 
interest to recall that environmental predictability, Re, hardly varied between the factors 
identified in Table 2 and was always close to mean Rs, response consistency (the 
correlation between the means of the two measures being close to zero).  In addition, the 
pattern of correlations between the various indices revealed that achievement, ra, was 
more strongly correlated with Rs than with Re (0.52 vs. 0.40) and that whereas Rs was 
correlated with G (matching), Re was not.  Thus, although environmental predictability, 
Re, undoubtedly limits achievement, in these data it explains little variance in differential 
achievement. Instead, this variance is more adequately captured by G and Rs, i.e., by the 
particular strategy the judge uses and how consistently this is executed.  
Limitations and further research.   The limitations in our conclusions result from 
the fact, that taken as a whole, the 259 environments that we studied could hardly be 
described as being generated by principles of representative design (Brunswik, 1956, see 
also Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004).  For example, most of the laboratory studies 
had little or no inter-cue redundancy, an important component of realistic task 
environments, whereas this feature was present in field studies. In particular, very few 
laboratory learning studies (8%) contained much redundancy, and yet, we found that 
greater levels of redundancy lead to better learning.   
Interestingly, the presence of redundancy is an important ingredient of Brunswik’s 
psychological framework and suggests that people use different combinations of cues 
across different trials (so-called vicarious functioning).  Unfortunately, by estimating 
unique sets of weights for individuals across trials, the linear lens model methodology 
does not capture this aspect of how people may be processing information.  This, Determinants of linear judgment 
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therefore, points to the need to develop methodology that can capture this dimension of 
behavior within a lens model framework and thereby also allow a better understanding of 
the effects of redundancy.  In other words, the methodology assumes that participants are 
processing the information in a linear manner which, for many tasks, may not be the case. 
Recently, there have been some promising and illuminating examples of how lens 
model research can be conducted in more representative and naturally occurring 
environments. Specifically, Gosling and his colleagues have investigated overall 
achievement and matching (of “cue validities” with “utilization coefficients”) in 
judgments of personality made on the basis of the target person’s office or bedroom 
(Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002), websites (Vazire & Gosling, 2004), musical 
preferences (Rentfrow & Gosling, 2006), and sounds experienced over two days (Mehl, 
Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006). We see this work as being very much in the right 
direction as it neatly captures what people actually do in their natural ecologies. 
One advantage of the mathematical formulation of the lens model (i.e., Equation 3) 
is the neat expression of results in terms of correlational statistics. However, underlying 
this feature is the implicit assumption that errors in judgment should, in effect, be 
penalized by a (symmetric) squared error loss function. It may be that in some situations 
– and particularly in field studies – that this assumption is not appropriate. Work in 
extending the mathematical framework would thus be most important. It is possible that 
some of the results we have obtained should be modified. 
An important limitation of our investigation was that few studies reported 
individual level data and thus we were forced to make our analyses on the basis of 
averages.  This limited our ability to comment on individual variability but reflects Determinants of linear judgment 
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reporting practices in science as opposed to specific limitations of lens model studies per 
se. Improvements in information processing and storage in recent years could be 
harnessed to alleviate this problem in the future. It would be useful, for example, to make 
use of multi-level hierarchical techniques (see, e.g., Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to 
understand simultaneous group and individual level behavior in lens model studies. 
Castellan (1973; 1992) has provided an illuminating critique of the meaning of the 
matching index, G, in lens model studies pointing out some limitations in its 
interpretation due to mathematical constraints.  In our summary data, however, we find 
little evidence for Castellan’s critiques. One reason could be the artificial nature of many 
of our studies (with orthogonal cues) that allow less ambiguous inferences. Second, most 
studies involved only two or three cues although it is true that G was lower with more 
than three cues and, particularly, in field studies. 
Our results regarding the factors that affect the accuracy of human judgment and 
the effectiveness of learning also suggest promising directions for further research. First, 
interactions between task variables can be studied to identify the most optimal conditions 
for using clinical judgment. For example, in the data we examined, learning is only 
possible when environments contain cue redundancy. Another important mediator of 
learning is task information feedback. It would be interesting to investigate the joint 
effect of the two factors. The data in our sample are insufficient to perform a complete 
analysis, but our preliminary investigation shows that the positive effect of task 
information feedback is more likely to occur when cue redundancy is present.  
Second, it would be illuminating to study the interactions of task variables and 
judge characteristics. For example, we found that judges match environmental models Determinants of linear judgment 
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better in redundancy-free environments. Does this finding apply to both novices and 
experts? Do these two groups of judges react similarly when facing redundancy? One of 
our other findings suggests that the presence of redundancy may only be beneficial if 
judges possess sufficient expertise to face it. The interaction of cue redundancy and 
expertise should be addressed explicitly in further research. 
 Parenthetically, we note that advances in technology can greatly help collecting 
data within the paradigm of Brunswik’s (1956) paradigm of representative design and 
linking this with lens model analysis.   Hogarth (2006) and Hogarth, Portell, and Cuxart 
(2007), for example, have exploited the SMS capacity of cell telephones to conduct 
Experiential Sampling Method (ESM) studies of decision making and the perception of 
risk. And Mehl et al. (2006) have pioneered the use of the Electronically Activated 
Recorder (EAR) to sample snippets of ambient sounds in people’s environments which 
can subsequently be used as cues for judgments made by others (see also Mehl, 2006).  
Moving forward, it is hard not to be optimistic about harnessing these and related 
technological developments provided researchers are willing to avail themselves of these 
opportunities.    
 Concluding remarks.   Experimental sciences – like psychology – advance in 
incremental fashion. New studies appear each year often as a response to immediately 
preceding papers and what might be called “local” issues (i.e., those that mark certain 
points in time).  One can understand, therefore, why – at the level of individual studies – 
researchers often adopted simple research designs involving only a few orthogonal cues. 
It is interesting to ask, therefore, how studies might have been planned some fifty years 
ago had a future meta-analysis been considered a goal of the research program. How Determinants of linear judgment 
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would the studies have differed?  What else would be known today had we been able to 
plan studies in 259 environments in advance? 
  This question cannot, of course, be answered unless one first decides on the 
appropriate research questions. In broad terms, therefore, and using hindsight, the main 
questions that dominated the research program center not so much on “how good” people 
are at making judgments per se, but on defining the individual and tasks conditions that 
lead to differential levels of judgment and this includes, of course, learning.  This being 
the case, it can be regretted now that more attempts were not made to widen the kinds of 
environmental tasks that participants faced.  At the same time, the pioneers of lens model 
studies probably did not envisage the possibilities of meta-analysis which is a fairly 
recent methodological innovation. However, current researchers are aware of this 
methodology and, since the lens model paradigm lends itself so well to the methodology, 
we hope that future research can take our analysis as a starting point.  Indeed, the spread-
sheet on which our analysis is based is available at www.xxxxxxxx.
7  
Going forward, we note several challenges to research within the lens model 
paradigm.  One – just noted – is to develop methodology that is more flexible in 
modeling how judges use information. The second – also noted above – is the systematic 
use of representative design.  From many lens model studies, it is not at all obvious to 
which populations results should or could be generalized.  For example, some of our 
learning environments involved situations where cues had to be “achieved” by 
participants, and, in these environments, learning effects on human achievement were 
greater than in those where cues were “given.”  More generally, this point also speaks to 
                                                 
7  It is our intention to make this spreadsheet both available and user-friendly in the near future. Determinants of linear judgment 
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the issue of studying substantive experts and finding the means to replicate expertise 
within laboratory settings. 
Finally, whereas we have been critical of the limitations of the current linear 
technology of lens model analysis, we are impressed by the richness of the findings we 
have uncovered.  With more flexible technology, and clearer ideas of how knowledge can 
be accumulated, we believe that Brunswik’s lens model still holds many insights that 
await discovery. Determinants of linear judgment 
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Stan.
Mean Median Min Max dev n
r a 0.55 0.57 -0.06 1.00 0.24 259
G 0.81 0.91 -0.01 1.00 0.23 249
R e 0.79 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.19 256
R s 0.80 0.83 0.29 1.00 0.14 250
C 0.05 0.00 -0.11 1.00 0.16 246
GR e 0.64 0.68 -0.01 1.00 0.24 242
GR s 0.66 0.73 -0.01 1.00 0.24 243
r a G R e R s C GR e
r a x
G 0.77 x
R e 0.40 0.02 x
R s 0.52 0.42 0.08 x
C 0.28 0.10 -0.11 -0.01 x
GR e 0.90 0.79 0.61 0.38 0.06 x
GR s 0.81 0.91 0.06 0.72 0.05 0.76
Bold: p < 0.01
Correlations 
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Number of
tasks Judges Judgments r a G R e R s C GR s GR e GR e-r a
Numbers of cues
26 9 2 6 4 8 0.63 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.07 0.71 0.71 0.08
39 0 1 9 9 3 0.55 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.00 0.72 0.69 0.13
more than 3 97 16 111 0.51 0.71 0.79 0.81 0.08 0.58 0.55 0.07
Type of cues
Given 211 18 55 0.55 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.03 0.67 0.64 0.10
Achieved 40 23 263 0.60 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.13 0.63 0.63 0.05
Redundancy
None 106 20 50 0.61 0.89 0.82 0.81 0.03 0.73 0.72 0.11
Some 78 19 97 0.53 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.03 0.66 0.62 0.09
High 25 26 101 0.54 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.10 0.64 0.58 0.04
Function form
Equal weighting 42 29 65 0.66 0.91 0.82 0.81 0.02 0.75 0.75 0.10
Compensatory 88 16 99 0.57 0.84 0.79 0.83 0.04 0.70 0.66 0.10
Non-compensatory 54 22 40 0.51 0.80 0.84 0.74 0.04 0.62 0.65 0.14
Type of study
Lab 208 20 87 0.56 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.04 0.67 0.66 0.10
Field 48 16 89 0.52 0.74 0.76 0.84 0.09 0.63 0.57 0.06
Expertise
Novice 200 20 67 0.56 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.03 0.67 0.67 0.11
Some training 29 16 208 0.59 0.84 0.72 0.85 0.09 0.73 0.61 0.05
Expert 27 13 110 0.49 0.68 0.74 0.83 0.17 0.57 0.51 0.01
Learning
Stable 67 22 155 0.44 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.09 0.54 0.49 0.07
Learning 186 19 64 0.60 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.03 0.71 0.70 0.10
Note:  Bold letters denote significant differences for a measure (p < .05)
Average number of:
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None 0.61 (106) -- (0) --
Some 0.53 (58) 0.52 (20) ns. 
High 0.36 (7) 0.61 (18) t(23)=-2.53, p=0.019.  





None 0.72 (12) 0.73 (86) ns. 
Some 0.58 (20) 0.69 (57) t(75)=-2.03, p=0.046. 
High 0.46 (13) 0.83 (12) t(23)=-4.01, p=0.001. 
Note: Number of observations is given in parentheses. 
Stable  Learning 
Table 3:  Mean achievement, ra, in lab and field studies, 











Table 4:  Mean linear cognitive ability, GRs, in learning and stable studies,  
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Improvement of: Number of  Pre-learning level of:
learning trials  GR s r a
Overall 0.20 (131) 0.18 (138) 103 0.51 0.41
By type of cues: 
Given 0.17 (118) 0.16 (125) 95 0.56 0.43
Achieved 0.47 (13) 0.38 (13) 188 0.08 0.22
By type of feedback: 
No feedback  0.28 (10) 0.26 (10) 77 0.49 0.33
Outcome feedback  0.17 (92) 0.15 (99) 115 0.53 0.44
Cognitive feedback  0.25 (25) 0.21 (25) 74 0.48 0.34
Task information  0.35 (19) 0.29 (33) 105 0.35 0.23
Other types 0.09 (4) 0.07 (4) 86 0.54 0.37
Note: Number of observations is given in parentheses. 
GR s r a
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Dependent variable: 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Predictor: 
Intercept -- -- 0.48 4.31 -- -- 0.37* 2.82
Initial GRs (ra) -0.42* -4.12 -0.29* -3.20 -0.57* -10.70 -0.37* -3.26 -0.30* -2.89 -0.25* -3.75
Number of learning trials 0.0006 1.98
Number of cues  0.07* 2.40 0.05 2.11
Achieved/given 0.24 3.58 0.41 5.30






Task Information 0.10 2.31 0.12* 2.70 0.08 2.07
Other




Notes:   
(1)  We only report coefficients that are statistically significant (p < .05)
(2)  *  p < .01
(3)  Models 1A and 1B are obtained using an OLS procedure with White-adjusted standard errors; Model 2 is a robust WLS procedure. 
0.82 0.46
Change in GRs Change in ra
Model 1A  Model 1B Model 2 Model 1A  Model 1B Model 2
0.63 0.53
91 91 91 98 98 98
0.54 0.68
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Predictor:
Intercept 0.51 11.46 0.18 4.93
R e 0.12 5.05 - -
R s -0.56 -16.10 - -
R s-R e - - -0.23 -8.80
C -0.48 -11.36 -0.35 -6.36
Number of cues 
Achieved/given -0.04* -2.35 -0.04* -2.15
Cue redundancy -0.02 -3.13
Weighting function
Lab/field study 0.05 2.78
Learning/stable study  -0.06 -3.86





1. A robust WLS procedure has been  used. 
2. * p < 0.05; all other p < 0.01. Only significant coefficients are reported. 
150 150
Model 1 Model 2
0.77 0.53
Table 7: Task and judge characteristics explaining the advantage of bootstrapping: 
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criterion value = 
e Y  
subject response  = 
s Y  
predicted subject response  = 
s Y ˆ  
predicted criterion value = 
e Y ˆ  
environmental 
predictability 
e eY Y e R ˆ ρ =  
response  
linearity 
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i eX Y ρ
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Figure 1: Diagram of lens model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 